By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

In pursuit of rare earth elements (REEs), U.S. President Donald Trump hosted the leaders of five Central Asian states at the White House on 6 November. China currently controls about 90 percent of global REE processing and, amid its trade conflict with the U.S., expanded export restrictions in October, constricting U.S. access to critical minerals. For an REE-dependent Washington, Central Asia offers an attractive opportunity for sourcing refined materials, particularly via the Middle Corridor linking the region to Europe through the South Caucasus. China holds nearly all rare-earth mining leases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Russia remains the dominant actor in Kazakhstan, which possesses the world’s third-largest REE reserves. This competition for control over REEs positions Central Asia as a potential focal point of a twenty-first-century “Great Game.”



                                                                    Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Rare earth elements (REEs) constitute critical minerals essential to the production of twenty-first-century high-technology systems, including smartphones, wind turbines, electric vehicles, advanced weaponry, and fighter aircraft.

In 2024, the International Energy Agency projected that global demand for critical minerals will increase fourfold by 2040. This projection has further elevated the strategic importance of resource-rich Central Asia, as Western governments intensify efforts to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on China, which dominates global production and processing of rare earths and other rare metals.

China, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of global REE mining, introduced new export restrictions on critical rare earths and rare metals in October, intensifying global competition for control over these strategic resources. Central Asia’s substantial and largely untapped reserves of critical minerals have consequently drawn heightened attention from major powers seeking to secure alternative supply sources. The region’s significance is further underscored by the fact that it produces approximately half of the world’s uranium.

The U.S. Geological Survey classifies the 17 rare earth elements as critical minerals due to their essential role in national and economic security. This strategic importance underpins the United States’ interest in gaining access to Central Asia’s substantial untapped REE reserves. For instance, Kazakhstan possesses one of the world’s largest undeveloped tungsten deposits, a metal integral to the production of projectiles, ammunition, and other defense-related technologies in the U.S.

In March, Uzbekistan announced the discovery of deposits containing more than 30 rare metals, including tungsten, molybdenum, magnesium, lithium, and titanium. The government simultaneously unveiled plans to implement 76 projects dedicated to the extraction and processing of rare metals over the next three years, with a projected investment of US$ 2.6 billion. In July, the head of Tajikistan’s Geology Department reported the discovery of significant niobium and tantalum deposits in the country’s Rasht Valley. Both metals are considered strategically important: niobium is widely used in the aerospace and construction industries, while tantalum is essential for the manufacture of advanced electronic components.

China and Russia have been the principal importers of Kazakhstan’s critical minerals. In 2023, Kazakhstan exported critical minerals valued at US$ 3.07 billion to China and US$ 1.8 billion to Russia, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), an online trade analytics platform.

In September, Kazakhstan concluded a US$ 4.2 billion agreement with the U.S. rail manufacturer Wabtec during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Under the terms of the deal, the U.S. company will supply 300 locomotives to support the modernization of Kazakhstan’s railway system and will additionally participate in the development of regional transport corridors linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus.

In light of China’s recent export restrictions, the U.S. is increasingly turning its attention to resource-rich Central Asia in an effort to diminish Beijing’s dominance over global critical-mineral supply chains. In October, the U.S. government facilitated negotiations between a U.S. firm and Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund aimed at developing the country’s largest untapped tungsten deposits.

President Donald Trump held bilateral meetings in the Oval Office with officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as he hosted the Central Asian leaders in Washington for a high-profile summit on November 6.

IMPLICATIONS: Pursuing their own competing strategic agendas, China, Russia, the U.S., and the EU are increasingly engaged in what has been described as the “Great Game of the twenty-first century,” catalyzed in part by China’s newly imposed export restrictions on critical minerals. At the center of this geopolitical contest lies the effort to secure control over Central Asia’s vast, untapped reserves of rare earth elements (REEs).

Bound by the war in Ukraine since February 2022, Russia remains unwilling to cede influence in Central Asia, particularly as Western engagement in the region’s critical mineral sector continues to grow. At the same time, the U.S. is poised to increase investment in Central Asia’s undeveloped rare earth deposits as it seeks to reduce its dependence on China.

Leveraging its geographic proximity and extensive processing capacity, China has already established itself as the dominant actor in Central Asia’s rare earths sector. In a move to further consolidate its control over critical minerals, Beijing imposed prohibitions on the export of key processing technologies. Seeking to counter U.S. and European efforts to restructure global supply chains and diminish Chinese influence, China has also moved to secure mining rights directly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

China’s dominance in rare earth mining, processing, and refining enables it to employ these resources as a geopolitical instrument vis-à-vis Western competitors. In 2010, Beijing demonstrated this leverage by halting REE exports to Japan during a maritime dispute, disrupting Japan’s high-technology sector. Today, China’s influence in global trade, negotiations, and technological competition remains closely tied to its control over REE production and processing.

Moscow views China’s expanding role in Central Asia’s rare earth sector as a counterbalance to growing U.S. and EU influence. At the same time, Russia seeks to preserve its own position in the region, particularly in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry. Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer, depends heavily on Russia for transportation and processing, and remains a key supplier to Russia, which also holds ownership stakes in several Kazakh uranium mines.

There is substantial potential for a U.S.–Central Asia partnership grounded in shared interests in the critical minerals sector. The U.S. urgently requires access to the region’s uranium, antimony, tungsten, and other strategic minerals to strengthen its supply chains, while Central Asian states seek significant U.S. investment to develop their resource bases. Reflecting this alignment, the Trump administration has prioritized deeper engagement with the region. As Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor emphasized at the November summit, the president’s commitment ensures that Central Asian leaders “have a direct line to the White House” and receive the attention the region “very much deserves.”

Regional connectivity and security will be central to U.S. efforts to extract and transport Central Asia’s critical minerals. Establishing safe and reliable trade routes is essential, and Washington is likely to back corridors that bypass Russia and link the region directly to Western markets. In this context, the Middle Corridor, which circumvents Russia by connecting China to Europe through the South Caucasus, holds particular strategic appeal alongside Central Asia’s substantial mineral reserves.

China’s dominance in processing critical metals in Central Asia is facilitated by weak regulatory frameworks that allow environmentally harmful practices. For the U.S. to compete effectively, it would likewise face pressure to follow suit.

CONCLUSIONS: Geopolitically, the principal challenge for the U.S. and its Western partners is to offset the influence of China, which dominates the global REE supply chain. By expanding infrastructure investment and deepening partnerships with Central Asian states, the U.S. can position the region as a reliable partner in its rare earth supply networks.

As U.S. interest in Central Asia’s largely untapped critical mineral reserves grows, the region stands to benefit from increased investment and expanded partnerships with Washington. Such engagement would reduce Central Asia’s reliance on China and Russia and help counterbalance their influence in the region.

China’s geographic proximity and extensive REE processing capacity give it a significant advantage over the U.S. in the competition for Central Asia’s rare earth resources. Central Asian states are likely to remain dependent on Chinese and Russian supply chains unless they can surmount persistent political, infrastructural, and environmental constraints.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.  Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Nargis Kassenova

The dramatic events of 2022 - the January unrest in Kazakhstan and Russia’s war against Ukraine - upended the status quo in Kazakhstan-Russia relations. Astana must now address both long-standing vulnerabilities—security, political, and economic—and new pressures in areas such as inter-elite relations (as they shape up in the process of "denazarbayevization"), nuclear energy, and history writing. The Tokayev government seeks to accommodate Russia as much as possible while advancing Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, which requires constant adjustments and trade-offs.

Read Kazakhstan-Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure

By Stephen Blank

Just as Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to a cease-fire on October 19, representatives of the Taliban were in New Delhi reviving India’s long-standing ties with Afghanistan, demonstrating the interconnections between Afghanistan, Central Asia as a region, and the rivalries that drive Asian politics, i.e. the Indo-Pakistani-China triangle. In turn, this signifies the region’s increasing importance to major external actors as well as the growing importance and agency of Central Asian states. 

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: India’s rapprochement with Afghanistan follows the examples of China, Russia, and Central Asian states. Although Pakistan promoted the Taliban during the insurgency against the U.S., their relations have deteriorated since 2021. Pakistan has increasingly charged the Taliban with sheltering and supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for a surge of deadly attacks inside Pakistan. This tension has led to frequent and sometimes deadly border clashes, airstrikes, and the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Despite the latest cease-fire, continued tensions can be expected along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

There are compelling reasons for India and Afghanistan to resume ties and connections, e.g., air flights from New Delhi to Kabul. Prior to the Taliban takeover, India had a thriving, strategically motivated, relationship with Afghanistan. India is in a permanent state of tension with Pakistan, which continues to sponsor terrorist attacks on India, while China supports Pakistan to prevent India from rivalling it as an Asian great power. These two states have consistently sought with considerable success to isolate India from Central Asia, thereby giving China a freer hand in the region.

Pakistan has long strived to have hegemonic influence over Afghan governments. It previously sponsored the Taliban against the pro-Western and pro-Indian Karzai and subsequent governments in Afghanistan. Consequently, as Taliban ties to Pakistan eroded and the need for economic support from abroad grew, India has emulated other actors in Central Asia to resume ties with Afghanistan.

India, Central Asian governments, Russia, and China have congruent economic-political reasons for restoring ties to Kabul. The same is true for Washington, although to a lesser degree. All these governments have concluded that if they wish to prevent the Afghan government from sponsoring terrorism, whether against Russia, Uzbekistan, or China, they must engage seriously, and enter into diplomatic relations, with Afghanistan.

Similarly, by virtue of its geographical location Afghanistan is instrumental to transcontinental trade and transportation routes, including the Middle Corridor and Belt and Road, leading from China through Central Asia to Europe. The construction of such corridors is now one of the most urgent issues on the agenda for these states, making a reasonably secure and robust economic engagement with Afghanistan a necessity for both Central Asian states and China. As a result of this awareness, we now see numerous proposals for a railway and other transportation routes connecting Central Asia and China. The Afghan government also evidently grasps the need for secure and thriving economic links with its Central Asian neighbors, China, and Russia.

The enhanced understanding on all sides of the urgent need for improved connectivity obliges foreign governments to press for an end to support for terrorists. It remains to be seen if Kabul can or will terminate this support. If it does not, it will be shunned by its neighbors and potential partners.

Great power interest in Afghanistan is also fueled by the fact that previous international studies estimate that Afghanistan is sitting on an estimated US$ 1 trillion of rare earths and minerals. As access to these goods has now become a central issue in global politics, and especially Sino-American relations, there is an intensifying competition to gain secure and uncontested access to them. Once again, Afghanistan could become a central arena for great power rivalry.

Moscow needs good ties to Kabul to reinforce its overall Central Asian policy goals and prevent domestic terrorism; and also aspires to sell arms to Kabul. Soviet arms sales provided the basis for its earlier influence in Afghanistan, and Russia hopes to repeat this especially as it has little to offer economically compared to Beijing and Washington. The Trump Administration, apart from its growing obsession with rare earths, wants to regain access to Bagram Air Base to monitor Chinese military developments. 

IMPLICATIONS: Rising interest in ties with Afghanistan across the board opens the way for the Taliban to play the traditional small state game of hedging and balancing among competing foreign governments. However, the developments outlined above tell us things about Central Asia that are prospectively much more important. First, Central Asian states that are displaying ever more interest in regional cooperation and integration now acknowledge that their region is incomplete if Afghanistan does not or cannot participate in it. This insight applies with equal force to economic issues as well as security concerns. For them, no discussion of the regional future is complete without including Afghanistan. Therefore, they are promoting bilateral and regional plans for projects to expand trade, transport, and technology projects to Afghanistan.

Second, it appears that all of the major foreign state actors appreciate the fact that for economic, political, and strategic reasons they all need to engage not only Afghanistan but the entire region. This awareness enhances their mutual rivalries throughout Central Asia but also prospects for Central Asian states to acquire much needed foreign assistance, on better terms than if they were dependent on only one foreign provider. This foreign rivalry enhances their economic and security capabilities while also creating a possibility to pacify Afghanistan’s domestic and foreign policies.

However, as is often the case, these potential benefits come at a price. Although Central Asian states, India, China, Russia, and the U.S, are all engaging Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they can induce it to stop supporting terrorism even if it is directed at Pakistan, itself a known supporter of terrorism. Thus, Central Asian states that depend to some degree on the economic-political development of Afghanistan cannot escape involvement in the tangled relations of South Asia. To the extent that Central Asian states hope to include Afghanistan in their future projects this involvement is unavoidable.

Meanwhile, Pakistan and China work steadily to impede India’s engagement with Central Asia. Chinese analysts increasingly frame the Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions with reference to a wider Indian role as manifested in India’s ties to Afghanistan. Pakistan fears such connections and strongly objected to the references to Jammu and Kashmir in the Indo-Afghan communique.

Moreover, Uzbekistan is now expressing its interest in obtaining a permanent berth at the Iranian port of Chabahar in Iran. It has held meetings with Iranian and Indian officials to gain this position because this port, apart from figuring prominently in Iran’s regional commercial ambitions, is critical to India’s efforts to leapfrog or bypass Pakistani obstruction of its Central Asian policies.

The entanglement in South Asia’s rivalries is part of a larger trend where Central Asia is increasingly tied to developments in other regions. Central Asian economies are profoundly affected by the war in Ukraine. Similarly, there is mounting interest in Central Asian countries joining the Abraham Accords, a move that increases their political and strategic involvement in the Middle East on top of their growing economic ties with states of the Persian Gulf.

CONCLUSIONS: The impending Sino-American rivalry over rare earths cannot but draw Central Asian states, including Afghanistan, into the Sino-American, and possibly Sino-European tensions. Thus, what we are now seeing in the spillover of South Asian tensions into Central Asia and vice versa, given the TTP raids into Pakistan, signify the full arrival and agency of Central Asian states as individual and regional actors of more than local significance. These trends will undoubtedly continue but how they develop depends on the actions of all the relevant policymakers involved. While those actions cannot be foreseen, Central Asian states will not be merely the object of other states’ designs but independent actors whose policies, be they support for terrorism or large-scale connectivity projects, will impact trends far beyond their borders.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Charlotte Krausz

President Trump's recent imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil signals a potential expansion of secondary sanctions to other Russian energy customers. The policy shift threatens to extend punitive measures to post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that remain heavily dependent on Russian energy infrastructure. While aimed at curtailing Russia's war revenues, such measures could paradoxically drive these strategically important regions closer to Moscow's orbit, undermining years of U.S. and EU engagement in the region.

Gazprom headquarters in St. Petersburg, Russia (Image Courtesy of Flickr)

BACKGROUND: In his statements, Trump has criticized countries that import oil and accused them of funding the “Russian war machine.” By stopping Russia’s revenues from its largely petrostate-based war economy, the U.S. seeks to thwart Russian advances in Ukraine and punish Putin. Yet imposing high tariffs on countries dependent on Russia for their energy supply, especially on post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, could have far worse ramifications for U.S. and EU aspirations in the region and drive former Soviet republics closer to Russia once more

A key example of this policy shift occurred in the first days of August 2025, when President Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff (later raised to 50 percent) on India for being a major buyer of Russian oil. Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of India, said that “the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable.” Given that India buys one-third of its crude oil from Russia, India is unlikely to change course, and the tariffs have badly damaged relations with India. The move is especially surprising given Trump’s past cordial relationship with Modi and the Biden administration's geopolitical courting of India. Biden even hosted Modi for a state dinner in June 2023.

In a recent opinion piece in The Washington Post, Andriy Yermak, Ukraine’s chief of the presidential office, praised the high tariffs on India. Yermak declared that it was a “great first step” but called for more pressure and for a “full economic blockade” of Russia. While Ukraine understandably wants everything possible to be done to end the war and bring peace, not all avenues will lead to the desired outcome. The decision for Europe to get off Russian oil following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was apparent and necessary. And though it led to an increase in energy costs and inflation, alternative energy sources were found, and Russia lost a vital stream of revenue. The expansion of these sanctions, this reasoning goes, will help the war effort and thwart Russia’s imperial ambitions.

But this strategy could be disastrous if poorly applied, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where countries are still dependent on Russia for energy needs. The energy landscape in Central Asia reflects decades of Soviet-era infrastructure and integration. Central Asian countries, except oil-rich Turkmenistan, remain highly reliant on Russian energy infrastructure and benefit from shared Soviet-era energy grids and the Eurasian Economic Union.

The South Caucasus presents a similar case. Georgia and Armenia, even more so, are largely dependent on Russian oil and have limited energy supply options. Georgia lacks domestic oil refineries and imports primarily from Russia and Azerbaijan, with Russian imports recently surpassing Azerbaijani supplies for the first time in eighteen years despite troubled bilateral relations. Armenia faces even greater constraints, with Gazprom maintaining a monopoly over natural gas imports and distribution. Natural gas made up 80 percent of Armenia’s energy imports in 2020. The rest comes from Iran in an electricity-for-natural trade deal. Armenia’s natural gas imports are delivered through the North-South Gas Pipeline via Georgia. Other regional pipelines bypass Armenia due to geopolitical conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the closure of European markets to Russian oil after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian energy companies redirected their focus towards Central Asia, leading to an increase in Russian energy imports into the region. Russia and Central Asian countries rely on the same Soviet-era-built energy grid and EAEU membership. Russian investment in Central Asia’s energy infrastructure has expanded since 2022, including nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and hydroelectric facilities elsewhere. Even Kyrgyzstan, despite being a renewable energy leader, plans to double its Russian oil imports by 2040.

Despite their energy dependence on Russia, both Armenia and Georgia have sought EU membership in the past. Both countries have undergone democratic revolutions, although their current political situations are tenuous. After Russia failed to defend Armenia from Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive, public opinion of Russia dramatically decreased, with two-thirds expressing a negative view and 40 percent viewing Russia as a threat. When the Georgian government withdrew from EU accession in November 2024, protests lasted for months demanding a reversal. Armenia and Georgia also share ties to Europe and the U.S. in terms of tourism, culture, and ethnic diasporas.

The U.S. imposing sanctions or high tariffs on countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus has the potential to undo decades of U.S. outreach to these regions. These could not separate their energy supplies from Russia without great harm to their own economies, nor would such a tradeoff be worth it to them. Antagonist trade policies would increase anti-American sentiment, inhibit future American investment, and thrust these post-Soviet states back into Moscow’s orbit.

Secondary sanctions on Russian oil importers are not assured to change the situation on the ground in Ukraine, which has been at a territorial standstill for months. Russia has proved more than capable of keeping its war machine growing and expanding under international sanctions. These approaches are less effective than simply supplying Ukraine directly with the weapons it needs to liberate territory and defend its skies.

Should the U.S. see strategic importance in weaning post-Soviet republics off Russian oil, it could encourage alternative energy routes and the use of renewable energy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are already at the forefront in renewables like wind and hydroelectric power. A key alternative route could source energy from Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world. As Michael Doran from the Hudson Institute explains, “We just need a few kilometers of pipeline to be built in order to connect up Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan, which can then flow comfortably to Europe across Georgia … Turkmen Gas could end the dependence of Europe on Russian gas.” In addition, the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan presents new energy options for Armenia. If Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey were to be opened, it could diversify its energy imports rather than remaining reliant on Russia.

CONCLUSIONS: Post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucasus are caught between a revanchist Russia and growing ties with the West. Central Asia and the South Caucasus have much to offer the West, from energy deposits to critical minerals, emerging democracies, and tourism. A “full economic blockade” would not only be impossible to enforce but also detrimental to long-term U.S. interests.

The countries of the Central Asia and Caucasus regions are aware of the great power rivalries surrounding them. They understand their precarious situations and the importance of not antagonizing Russia. If the U.S. wants to have a presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in the decades to come, it must respect the inherent multilateralism of these regions. As the war in Ukraine drags on, Washington must decide to what extent it sees importance in stopping the flow of Russian oil. It must weigh the value of cutting Russian oil revenues against future relations with post-Soviet countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Charlotte Krausz is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council, a Washington-based think tank. She is an undergraduate at the University of St. Andrews studying International Relations and Persian.

By Svante E. Cornell

Read Layers of Cooperation: The Gradual Institutionalization of Central Asian Cooperation